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1On the Merit of the Legacy of Failed Olympic Bids*
Cesar R. Torres
Abstract: Olympic legacy has become a dominant theme within the Olympic Movement.  
For decades, legacy concerns were confined to the hosting of the Olympic Games.  
However, these concerns have been recently extended to the bidding process 
itself.  Cities bidding for the Olympic Games are now required to identify their 
legacy regardless of the outcome of their bids.  This paper explores the merits of 
extending legacy discourse in case bids failed.  It contends that the extension of 
legacy discourse into failed bids, at least as typically articulated in Olympic 
circles, is problematic.  It also contends that failed bids should be seen themselves 
as a form of legacy worth recognizing and protecting.
Key words: Olympic Games, Failed Bids, Legacy
Reference to legacy has permeated and shaped Olympic narratives since the creation of 
the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in the late nineteenth century.  However, it was only 
in the last three decades that legacy discourse became central in Olympic circles.  Thus, the IOC 
has been asking bidding cities to conceive and specify what they would leave behind to their 
local, regional, and national communities as well as to the Olympic Movement if they were 
awarded the right to host the Olympic Games.  Similarly, the IOC now monitors that the 
organizing committees of the Olympic Games follow through with their legacy promises.  The 
prevalence of legacy discourse prompted the IOC and the Autonomous University of Barcelona 
to organize a symposium in 2002 entitled “The Legacy of the Olympic Games: 1984–2000” to 
better understand the phenomenon and ultimately to more effectively ensure commendable 
Olympic legacies.1  Since then, Olympic legacy has increasingly attracted the attention of 
scholars, sport administrators, and international consultants.2
                                                           
* Paper written in the framework of the IOC’s OSC Postgraduate Grant Selection Committee (2011 meeting).
2So far, legacy discourse has been confined to what would be left behind as a result of the 
hosting of the Olympic Games.  Recent developments though have extended legacy concerns 
beyond the hosting of the Olympic Games to the bidding process itself.  In its Candidature 
Acceptance Procedure for the 2020 Olympic Games, the IOC asks prospective host cities to
clarify “the long-terms benefits for your city/region/country of . . . Bidding for the Olympic 
Games (irrespective of the outcome of the bid).”3  In other words, the IOC now expects even 
failed bids to leave behind some kind of beneficial effect at the local, regional, and national 
levels.  This novel twist in legacy discourse is expanding the attention of scholars to the study of 
failed bids’ inheritances.  A handful of scholarly works can be counted in this trend.4  Indeed, 
one of them claims that it “can be seen as the start of a new topic of future research regarding 
Olympic issues: the legacies of unsuccessful Olympic bids.”5  The author might be right.
The few scholarly works dealing with the legacy of failed Olympic bids are framed 
within the prevailing legacy discourse in Olympic circles.  Thus, they identify the potential 
legacy that failed bids can bring to a city, region, or nation.  By doing so, they presuppose that 
legacy speech makes sense for failed Olympic bids.  The purpose of this paper is to explore the 
merits of this presupposition.  Following the portraiture of a protracted South American bidding
resolve, the paper summarizes what bidding entails.  Then, it discusses the rise of legacy
discourse within the Olympic Movement.  Finally, in light of the previous sections, the paper 
analyzes whether bidding is amenable to the logic of legacy as articulated in Olympic circles.  
What the paper suggests is that requiring bids to work out a legacy in case they fail seems to go 
beyond what should be expected from a structure that is short-lived and typically disbands right 
after it learns it has failed.  However, it argues that failed bids should be seen themselves as a 
form of legacy worth recognizing and protecting.
3A South American Bidding Portraiture6
For the best part of modern Olympic history, Argentine Olympic officials sought not only 
to demonstrate their commitment to the Olympic Movement but also that they were at its 
forefront in South America.  One way in which these officials have done so was to continuously 
send robust delegations to the Olympic Games since the early 1920s.  Another way was their 
persistent efforts to host the Olympic Games in Buenos Aires, the capital of their country, ever 
envisioned by the elites as a South American enclave of Western civilization.  Indeed, Buenos
Aires vied, unsuccessfully, throughout the twentieth century to become the first South American 
city to host the Olympic Games.  That honor was ultimately secured by Rio de Janeiro in 2009 
when the IOC awarded the Brazilian city the right to host the 2016 Olympics.  However, the 
persistent efforts for an Olympic Buenos Aires as well as the manner in which they were, and 
are, conceived and remembered, raise questions that illuminate the poignant relationship between 
failed Olympic bids and their legacy.
As I have argued elsewhere, despite the fact that Pierre de Coubertin chose to include 
Argentine educator José B. Zubiaur to serve on the original IOC when it was established in 1894, 
the South American nation only showed interest in Olympic matters a decade later.7  In 1907, 
there was an attempt to send a national delegation to the 1908 Olympics.  Subsequently, in 1909, 
a prominent politician declared that someday the Olympic Games should be organized in Buenos 
Aires and that it was a national wish.  The following year, Buenos Aires hosted an international 
multi-sport event modeled after the Olympic Games commonly referred to as the Juegos 
Olímpicos del Centenario (Centennial Olympic Games) as part of the commemorations of the 
centenary of Argentina’s revolution for national independence.  Coubertin believed that the term 
4Olympic Games had been used improperly, which led to the expulsion of the Argentine IOC 
member that had replaced Zubiaur in 1907.
In the early 1920s, not only were two Argentines chosen to serve in the IOC but the 
nation also established a permanent Comité Olímpico Argentino ([COA] Argentine Olympic 
Committee) and started sending teams to the Olympic Games.  During the 1924 Olympics, one 
of the Argentine IOC members declared to his colleagues the national desire to host the Olympic 
Games in Buenos Aires in the future.  In 1925, Argentine Olympic officials declared their 
intention to bid for the 1936 Olympics, which was repeated in 1929.  Yet, by putting the bid on 
the back burner, the Argentines rendered it ineffectual.  Whatever the reasons behind that move,
at the 1932 Olympics, Buenos Aires was listed as a candidate to host the 1940 Olympics.  The 
South American city remained a candidate until 1935 but everything indicates that the candidacy 
was abandoned in Argentina.
These initial expressions of interests and attempts to host the Olympic Games in Buenos 
Aires were followed by three full bids.  The first was the bid for the 1956 Olympics.  This time 
the COA along with the government put together an elaborate plan and promotional campaign 
that impressed the IOC.  In the closest election ever, Buenos Aires lost to Melbourne in the 
fourth round of the 1949 election by a vote of 21-20.  Immediately after the loss, it was 
announced that Buenos Aires would bid for the 1960 Olympics, but with the changing political 
situation in the mid 1950s the Argentines abandoned the project.  Nonetheless, in 1962, local 
politicians and Olympic officials announced a Buenos Aires’ bid for the 1968 Olympics.  
Despite misgivings about the bid both in Argentina and abroad, authorities carried through with 
it, obtaining two meager votes in the 1963 election.  It took three decades for Buenos Aires to 
renew its hopes to host the Olympic Games.  In 1994, a committee was created to bid for the 
52004 Olympics.  It produced a comprehensive bid dossier.  Buenos Aires was chosen as one the 
five finalist cities in March 1997.  To the disappointment of bid officials, six months later, 
Buenos Aires tied with Cape Town in the first round of the election and was eliminated in the 
run-off.  In the early 2000s, a few voices declared that Buenos Aires could be the host of the 
2016 Olympics albeit to no ensuing action.  Lately, Argentine Olympic officials, conscious of
the city’s long-standing Olympic aspirations, have been demurely suggesting that Buenos Aires 
could bid again for future Olympic Games.8
Although concise, this account of Buenos Aires’ interest and failed bids to host the 
Olympic Games clearly points to the city’s rich, complex, and evolving history that links it to the 
Olympic Movement.  Even if unfulfilled, the one hundred year old aspiration of an Olympic 
Buenos Aires is an integral and vital part of the larger Argentine Olympic and sport narrative.  
Nonetheless, the city’s history of bidding for the Olympic Games (or its supposed commitment 
to the Olympic Movement for that matter) has not been intentionally given any place in its 
cultural landscape.  The Buenos Aires’ bids are mostly invisible in Buenos Aires.  The only 
public Olympic marker in the city is the Plazoleta Pierre de Coubertin, a small plaza adjacent to 
the French Embassy and a few blocks away from the COA, in the posh Recoleta neighborhood.  
The small plaza, which boasts a bust of the IOC founder, was donated to the city by the COA 
and inaugurated in 1992.9  It is primarily meant to honor Coubertin and the Olympic Movement.  
Unfortunately, there is no indication of the date of the small plaza’s inauguration nor are visitors
provided any reference regarding Argentina’s Olympic tradition.10  On a related note, the city’s 
bidding history only occupies a marginal space in the museum of the COA.
As suggested at the outset of this portraiture, its point is that it raises poignant questions
that illuminate the discussion on the relationship between failed Olympic bids and their legacy.  
6Have the Buenos Aires’ failed bids also been unsuccessful by not leaving behind any sort of 
material reality tying them more firmly, if largely symbolically, to Buenos Aires?  Should failed 
bids leave something prominent behind?  In other words, should they have to construct culturally 
significant “places”?  Are failed bids worthy of remembering or celebrating?  If so, how?  These 
are important questions directly related to the IOC’s new request that bids clarify what their 
legacy would be, successful or not.
Olympic Bidding
Simply put, Olympic bidding refers to the process by which cities interesting in hosting 
the Olympic Games make an offer for and attempt to secure such privilege.  In this sense, 
Olympic bidding is the formal procedure by which interested cities announce their intention to 
become Olympic hosts.  While bidding, interested cities articulate and propose a vision of what 
they are willing to provide the Olympic Movement for hosting the event.  By doing so, bidding 
cities hope to convince IOC members not only that their bids are coherent and viable but also 
that theirs are the most coherent and viable of all bids proposed for any given edition of the 
Olympic Games.  So, the core of Olympic bidding comprises of announcing (the intention to 
host the Olympic Games), requesting (the right to do so), offering (a vision for the Olympic 
Games), inviting (all members of the Olympic Movement to share this vision), and convincing 
(IOC members that this vision is worth supporting).  Given the requirements of Olympic bidding, 
the process presents ample junctures for vibrant debates on interested cities’ pasts and futures.  
Using Benedict Anderson’s terminology, Olympic bidding allows for interested cities to imagine 
how they have, are, and ought to develop in the future.11  It obviously involves complex 
7intersections of multiple stakeholders not only at the local level but at the regional, national, and 
international levels as well.
Olympic bidding was born with the creation of the IOC in 1894.  Nonetheless, the 
process has changed substantially in the almost one hundred and twenty years of modern 
Olympic history.  As argued by Martha McIntosh, “What was a simple strategic debate with only 
a few proposed candidates in 1894 . . . has gradually, over time, evolved into a highly detailed, 
lengthy, and competitive process that is undertaken by current candidate cities.”12  Although the 
details of the 1894 debate that led to the choice of Athens for the inaugural Olympic Games two 
years later are still unclear, bidding cities have indisputably been requested ever more 
sophisticated organizational demands.13  Yet, except for a brief period encompassing the election 
of the hosts of the Olympic Games between 1976 and 1988, interest in hosting the event has been 
strong and on the increase.
For about the first half of the twentieth century, Olympic bidding was not a standardized 
process and thus interested cities enjoyed considerable laxity while conceiving the structure and
specificity of their bids.  For instance, during that period, bidding frequently “consist[ed] of 
nothing more than a letter from the city’s mayor informing the IOC of the relevant decision by 
the city fathers and indicating sports venue already available or yet to be built.”14  Sometimes, 
the letter of intent came directly from national Olympic officials, while the support of the city’s 
authorities was, at best, implicit in the letter’s content.  Such a case was the Buenos Aires’ bid 
for the 1936 Olympics.15  According to the IOC, during the early years of Olympic bidding, by 
the time it “considered that the moment had come to decide, there usually remained only two 
serious contenders.”16  Probably, the laxity and informality of the bidding process contributed to 
the advancement of unsubstantiated bids without proper local support that, as the election date 
8approached, were subsequently abandoned.  Clearly, until the early 1950s, “applications from 
candidate city hopefuls had varied greatly in terms of both their design format and their 
informational content.”17
The increasing complexity, with its resultant challenges, of organizing the Olympic 
Games demanded the streamlining of the bidding process.  One incident that forcefully revealed 
this urgency was the unforeseen crisis created by the necessity to reallocate the equestrian events 
of the 1956 Olympics due to Australia’s equine quarantine law.  Apparently, Melbourne’s bid 
documents made no reference to such law.  Therefore, the IOC developed a questionnaire 
designed to address the organizational capabilities of potential hosts.  Starting with the bids for 
the 1960 Olympics, all bidding cities were required to submit their answers to the questionnaire 
as part of their bids.  The intention was to collect information that would allow the IOC to better 
assess bidding cities and thus more effectively decide the host of future Olympic Games.  By 
1955, the questionnaire had been incorporated into the Olympic Charter.18  In order to ensure 
that elected Olympic hosts fulfill their obligations, twenty years later, the IOC developed “a new, 
legally binding contract that would be in force with all host cities in the future,” that became an 
important element in the bid process.19
From a structural point of view, Olympic bidding remained, with some changes and 
additions, basically the same until the 1990s.  However, the answers to the questionnaire 
provided by bidding cities were increasingly elaborate and took the form of comprehensive 
dossiers or files that included several volumes.  A notable change in bidding came after the 
financial success of the 1984 Olympics.  To address the extremely competitive dynamic resulting 
from the precipitous surge of interest in Olympic bidding, the IOC placed more stringent 
demands than ever before on bid expenditures.  An even more drastic change was implemented 
9in the mid 1990s.  Facing a record number of nine bids for the 2002 Winter Olympics and a pool 
of eleven bids for the 2004 Olympics, the IOC implemented a two-tiered selection process that 
would facilitate the assessment of the bids and the election of the host cities as well as to reduce 
the expenditure of the bid committees.  In the first phase, the IOC Study and Evaluation 
Commission scrutinized the bids, including a visit to each of the cities, and prepared a report 
while the newly created IOC Electoral College chose the finalist bids.  The second phase, which 
included only those cities that were chosen as finalists, “reverted back to the established routine 
of IOC visits, bid books, presentations, voting, and the announcement of the winning city’s 
name.”20
Another substantial reform to the bidding process came as consequence of the “Olympic 
bribery scandal” of 1998 and 1999 that revealed schemes by which candidate cities attempted to
influence by dubious means, and apparently in many cases succeeded, the votes of IOC 
members.  Similarly, it was also revealed that IOC members had either solicited or taken 
indiscreet gifts or privileges from bidding cities.  What the scandal made clear was that the 
bidding process, at least in the late twentieth century, had been corrupted.21  The IOC launched 
an internal investigation and established two commissions to recommend any changes they
considered necessary and appropriate.  All in all, ten IOC members were brought down by the 
scandal.  Among the recommendations was the implementation of a new bidding procedure.  
Consequently, the bidding process currently encompasses two phases.  In the first, cities are 
“applicants” and they are required to submit detailed answers to a revised version of the IOC 
questionnaire, which is now divided in several “themes” and forms the basis of the technical 
analysis of each bid’s proposal.  Any application must be approved by the NOC of the country in 
which the city is located.  Applicant cities, much like in the past, establish a “bid committee” 
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whose mission is to articulate their efforts.   After the applicant cities’ bid dossiers are reviewed, 
the IOC Executive Board decides which ones will be accepted as “candidate” cities and therefore 
enter the second phase of the bidding process.
The second phase involves an Evaluation Commission that studies the candidatures, 
inspects the cities, and submits a report to all IOC members.  In turn, the IOC Executive Board 
draws up the final list of candidate cities that IOC members would vote on.  Noticeably, visits by 
IOC members to candidate cities are prohibited and they are not allowed to vote if they are 
nationals of a country that has a candidate city.  In addition, the election of a host city should 
take place in a country having no candidate city to host the Olympic Games.  The novel bidding 
process is meant not only to make it more transparent and minimize the potential for corruption 
and excessive lobbying but also to better assess interested cities’ technical capabilities as well as 
the viability of their projects, which would avoid unnecessary expenses by those cities deemed 
insufficiently prepared.
In sporting contexts, bids are classified in different ways.22  A thorough examination of 
them is beyond the scope of this paper.  However, for my purposes here, it is important to briefly 
distinguish two main types of bids.  The first type might be called “legitimate” bids.  These are 
bids whose main goal is to obtain the right to host the Olympic Games.  To accomplish that 
interested cities and their respective bid committees make a genuine effort to develop and present 
a bid dossier and campaign that is comprehensive, credible, and viable.  The second type might 
be called “utilitarian” bids.  These are bids whose main goal is not to obtain the right to host the 
Olympic Games but rather to use the bidding process as a means to achieve other goals.  For 
instance, bids could be implemented to globally advertise a city, region, or even country.  Bids 
could also be mounted to attract international tourism or transnational investment.  Similarly, 
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bids could be articulated to serve as a catalyst for social change or urban regeneration.  Another 
alternative is to use bids to gain relevant experience to mount a realistic Olympic bid in the 
future or to use them as stepping stones to bid for other global events, sporting or otherwise.  
This does not suggest that these bids are necessarily designed to lose, but while realizing the 
complexity of the challenge they recognize that success is unlikely and that bidding is a useful
process to go through.
The Rise of Legacy Discourse
In the Olympic Movement, the issue of legacy goes back to its very beginning.  Indeed, 
the conceptualization of both the Olympic Games and Olympism, its foundational philosophical 
vision, was tied to events and ideas that not only preceded them but also served as their 
inspiration.  Coubertin adamantly reinforced the notion that the modern Olympic Games were
inextricably woven to their ancient forbearer.  Yet, as a nineteenth century French aristocrat, 
Coubertin also embraced modern ideals of progress.23  His Olympic Games “came into existence 
in the dialectical cosmos bounded by conceptions of tradition and modernity” and “led him to 
propose the Olympics as a site for constructing common ground between the various ‘isms’ of 
modernity and the communal fealty of the traditional cosmos.”24  What this shows, as Mark 
Dyreson rightly contends, is that “the Olympics are themselves the legacies of other historical 
movements and moments” both ancient and modern.25  The constructed, and ever evolving, 
Olympic imagination started with a discourse juxtaposing legacies in order to promote a further 
legacy—which signifies a sort of founding Olympic legacy.  After all, Coubertin’s aspiration 
was that the Olympic Games offer a cosmopolitan platform to spread the internationalist mission 
of the Olympic Movement.
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Under the lofty goals of Olympism, the inauguration of the modern Olympic Games
meant that each edition of the event left an actual legacy, which obviously led to legacy 
awareness even if none of this was actually labeled “Olympic legacy” until after more than half a 
century later.  For instance,
The 1896 Athens Olympic Games drew aspects of the ancient Greek heritage into 
modern transformation, and these games left that city with a refurbished Panathenaic 
stadium (‘hard legacy’ in today’s parlance) and a renewed national Greek self-confidence 
(‘soft legacy’, as it would be said today).26
Prior to the late 1940s, bids to host the Olympic Games were not requested to and did not 
fully articulate what they planned to leave behind as a consequence of hosting the event.  
References in this regard were rather vague.  Interested cities emphasized their advantages and 
capability to serve as Olympic host and made promises to ensure the successful celebration of 
the event.  This does not mean that legacy identification was absent in early Olympic bids but 
that it was rather unarticulated and not labeled as such.  For example, the initial expressions of 
interest to bring the Olympic Games to Buenos Aires included the affirmation during the first 
decade of the twentieth century that the city would construct “a model house for the practice of 
physical exercises” and during the 1920s the promise of an elaborate sport complex that would 
include a stadium for 100,000 spectators.27  Early bids identified other positive outcomes, such 
as their willingness to encourage Olympic participation or their intention to generate revenue that 
would later be used for beneficial purposes.28  In spite of the implicit legacy identification during 
the first half of the twentieth century and the undeniable fact that every edition of the Olympic 
Games left something behind, the word legacy was not to be found in Olympic bids during this 
period.
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According to McIntosh, it was not until the late 1940s that a bid first included the word 
legacy in its bid documents.29  The pioneer bid was that of Melbourne for the 1956 Olympics.  
By the mid 1950s, the Olympic Charter made reference to the tangible and intangible potential 
benefits of hosting the Olympic Games.30  The progressive enlargement and global reach of the 
Olympic Games in the 1950s and 1960s, due in large part to the publicizing effects of television, 
gave some impetus to legacy as a relevant aspect of bidding for and hosting the event.31  In 
addition, this process was also fueled by the necessity of interested cities to justify to their 
citizens the resources needed for the organization of an event such as the Olympic Games, whose 
proportions were starting to grow markedly.  The expectation probably was that bid narratives 
that contained ideas about leaving something positive behind as a result of hosting the Olympic 
Games were more likely to be supported.  Given these conditions, along with the mounting 
challenges of hosting such an intricate event, the IOC progressively expanded its bid 
questionnaire to request more information regarding interested cities’ projected Olympic legacy.
If legacy discourse grew steadily during the thirty years following its appearance in bid 
documents in the late 1940s, it became a major concern in Olympic circles once the Olympic 
Games proved to be commercially viable during the 1980s and 1990s.  The prospect of profitable 
Olympic Games renewed the interest in hosting the event and generated much competition 
among bidding cities.  In turn, to distinguish themselves from and outdo one another, bidding 
cities started making ever more lavish promises in their bid dossiers.  These promises were 
difficult to fulfill and when fulfilled left host cities, on too many occasions, with white 
elephants32 or even substantial debt associated with presumably unnecessary expenditure.  On 
the one hand, the rise of legacy discourse within the Olympic Movement is a response to these 
new conditions, which also further address older ones such as the need to justify to local as well 
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as national communities the utilization of vast resources to organize the Olympic Games.  On the 
other hand, the rise of legacy discourse within the Olympic Movement is a way for the IOC to 
monitor the financial resources it transfers to organizing committees of the Olympic Games to 
ensure that bidding promises are carried through, to press for benefits that include a larger 
number of Olympic stakeholders, and to legitimize such request and monitoring.  In addition, 
legacy discourse legitimizes the aims of the IOC by giving substance to the claim that the 
Olympic Games can play a catalyst role for positive change.  Thus, legacy discourse, with its 
emphasis on planning and delivery, forces officials in bidding cities to be more prudent and
realistic about their promises both to their own citizens and to the IOC.  In short, legacy 
discourse validates bids locally as well as internationally, and thus the whole Olympic project, 
while serving a regulatory and monitoring function from bid conception to legacy evaluation, 
especially now that the IOC has developed The Olympic Games Impact Study with the intention 
to scientifically measure and analyze the effects of the Olympic Games on the host city, region, 
and country.
Legacy discourse is nowadays an integral part of the established and dominant Olympic 
lexicon.  John J. MacAloon maintains that legacy discourse has accomplished what brand 
discourse failed to do: it penetrated and was accepted throughout the entire Olympic system.  
Whereas for some in Olympic circles the attempt to conceive and explain Olympism as a brand 
was unpalatable and thus resisted embracing such logic, Olympic legacy was widely accepted 
not only without resistance but rather enthusiastically.33  After all, who would oppose an 
organizational rationality aimed at ensuring that the Olympic Games are not just an enormously 
expensive festival of fleeting allure but an event that also includes distinct plans to leave behind 
beneficial effects for the organizing city that perhaps extend to the city’s region and country?  In 
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MacAloon’s words, legacy discourse attained “in a very short time a cross-functional, cross-
contextual, transnational hegemony denied even to Olympic brand speech in its heyday.”34  In 
consonance, the Olympic Charter stipulates since the early 2000s that part of the role of the IOC 
is “to promote a positive legacy from the Olympic Games to the host cities and host countries.”35
There is considerable research focusing on the legacy associated with the Olympic 
Games.36  Despite this research, the intension and extension of the concept of legacy is still a 
topic of debate.  As Richard Cashman argued almost a decade ago, “Legacy is an elusive, 
problematic and even dangerous word.”37  This is in part due to the word’s multiple meanings 
and uses.  However, that the intension and extension of legacy are often debated does not mean 
that it lacks a central core of persistent and shared features.  Undeniably, legacy is related to 
what is bequeathed or handed down by a predecessor to a successor.  Both the predecessor and 
the successor could be understood as an individual or group of individuals as well as an event or 
era, which of course involve the actions of an individual or group of individuals.  That is to say, 
legacy involves a legator and a legatee.  Besides the form that legacy takes, in Olympic circles, 
since the 1980s, the word has been used “in a specific and targeted sense to refer to planned 
outcomes from the staging of an Olympic Games.”38  Typically, infrastructural, economical, 
cultural, and educational outcomes figure prominently in the legacy planning of both bids and 
organizing committees.39  Certainly, as it has been pointed out by some scholars, legacy is both 
planned and unplanned as much as positive and negative.40  However, the distinct intent is that 
legacy be planned and positive.
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Legacy and Failed Olympic Bidding
As of late, the pervasiveness of legacy talk in Olympic circles has extended beyond the 
organization of the Olympic Games and reached into the bidding process itself.  Whereas for 
decades the exclusive focus of the IOC was on the substantial bequest that the Olympic Games
themselves would offer a city, region, and country, bid officials nowadays have to enunciate 
what their bids would bequest to their cities, regions, and countries whether successful or not.41  
In other words, bid officials are expected to conceive two sets of legacy: one pertaining to the 
Olympic Games and another pertaining to the bid process.  Given the rise of legacy discourse 
(along with the “magical” properties MacAloon argues is ascribed to it by many in Olympic 
circles as the key not only to build successful bids’ storylines but also to coalesce Olympic 
affairs), this new reach is hardly surprising.42 As an IOC document expressly states, organizing
committees of the Olympic Games as well as interested cities should “look at what they believe
the Games, and even just bidding, can do for their citizens, cities and countries.”43
Even before the IOC formally extended legacy rationality into the bidding process by 
requesting interested cities to enunciate their plans for their bids’ legacy, a few bids articulated a 
legacy in case they failed to obtain the right to host the Olympic Games.  The Manchester 2000, 
Lille 2004, Sion 2006, and Chicago 2016 are increasingly mentioned as bids that, although 
unsuccessful, efficaciously planned for such eventuality and actually left behind a commendable 
legacy.  Manchester can show the National Cycling Centre and the Manchester Evening News 
Arena.  City officials in Lille affirm that the bid for the 2004 Olympics contributed to change the 
perception of their city both in France and abroad.  Sion bid officials argue that their efforts left a 
legacy of sustainable development awareness and a number of initiatives in this regard.  Finally, 
Chicago bid leaders created a youth sport organization during the applicant phase that received 
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financial support from the bid’s surplus.44  These bidding legacy projects are progressively seen 
as the winning side of losing bids.
If bids officials, and more broadly the Olympic system, are embracing the rationality of 
planning the legacy of failed bids, academics are starting to analyze such legacy and make 
recommendations for its implementation.  A recent master’s thesis argues that failed bids are 
capable of delivering considerable legacies.  Moreover, the study emphasizes that given the cost 
and problems associated with the legacy of hosting the Olympic Games, “it can even be 
proposed that submitting an unsuccessful Olympic bid can be the best possible scenario.”45  The 
author recommends that to succeed, the projected legacy of failed bids would be better off by 
integrating it into the city’s long-term vision, partnering with the public sector, and focusing on 
developing sport facilities.46  Another recent master’s thesis categorizes potential positive and 
negative legacies of failed bids.  It also makes a number of recommendations to minimize the 
latter and optimize the former.47  A third scholar endorses the notion of planning just to benefit 
by bidding.  The focus is on physical legacy and their capacity to generate other forms of 
legacies.  The author maintains that conceiving bids as a means to an end is the solution to a 
likely decline in the number of interested cities due to the rising cost of bidding.48
As is the case with Olympic authorities, the incipient scholarship of failed bids, in one 
way or another, embrace legacy discourse.  The studies mentioned above are indeed framed 
within the prevailing legacy discourse in Olympic circles.  By doing so, they presuppose that the 
extension of legacy speech into failed Olympic bids makes sense.  To analyze whether this is 
warranted, it is important to keep in mind what legacy has come to mean in Olympic circles as 
described above.
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There seems to be several problems with extending the characteristic legacy discourse in 
Olympic circles to the bidding process.  To start with, it seems that asking bid committees to 
plan for a legacy in case their bids to host the Olympic Games fail overburdens them.  Bid 
committees are formed to articulate coherent, credible, and viable blueprints to host the Olympic 
Games.  They have plenty of work to do in this regard and adding the conception of a legacy in 
case their bid is unsuccessful goes beyond their primary mandate.  This suggests that planning a 
legacy for failed bids could complicate as much as it could add additional costs to an already 
complicated and expensive process.  This could potentially distract bid officials from their
primary mandate.  As they might think that planning a legacy for failed bids might be an 
important factor in outbidding their competitors, these officials might start conceiving legacy 
projects that end up being unfulfilled promises or encumbrances for their cities.  If anything, in 
its complexity and cost, the bid process does not need to broaden its scope to the prospect of
failure nor it needs its potential negative consequences.
It should be remembered that bid committees are structures that function for a short 
period of time and are disbanded once the election is over.  This raises practical issues.  For 
instance, while bid committees articulate their legacy in case they fail, it most probably plays, at 
best, a negligible role and, at worst, no role at all in its implementation.  The projected legacy has 
to be implemented once the bid committees have disbanded.  Thus, another administrative 
structure has to interpret and implement the legacy design.49  Also, who would be in charge of 
overseeing and monitoring that what was promised by the bid committees actually materializes?  
Perhaps, it should also be remembered that given the number of white elephants and unfulfilled 
promises left by several Olympic Games’ organizing committees, the IOC now closely monitors 
the impact of hosting the event.  However, since organizing committees disband within two years 
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of their conclusion, there is not much the IOC can do to ensure positive legacies once the 
disbandment happens.  In light of the history of the legacy of the Olympic Games, from white 
elephants to current monitoring, the implementation and monitoring of what was promised by 
failed bids presents serious challenges.  It is unclear who would take on those tasks. The 
establishment of a legal framework to make sure failed bidding cities measure up to the 
responsibilities of their promised legacy could be an option to control the issue.  This, however, 
presents numerous challenges of its own and seems impractical.  One has only to consider the 
number of contracts that would have to be signed, not to mention the ramifications of any breach 
of them.
Another problem with planning for a legacy in case bids to host the Olympic Games fail 
is that they might promote the emergence of “utilitarian” bids.  As seen above, these are bids
whose main goal is not to obtain the right to host the Olympic Games but rather to use the 
bidding process as a means to achieve other goals.  Cities are increasingly using the bid process 
for a whole array of purposes, from positioning themselves as strategic destinations for global 
investment to coalescing forces to precipitate social change or urban regeneration.  The 
proliferation of a utilitarian outlook toward bidding could be potentially harmful to the Olympic 
Movement.  Cities would not be bidding with the intention to host the Olympic Games but 
simply because the bidding process offers an exceptional platform to further their goals.  It could 
be argued that interest in the bidding process is advantageous to the IOC.  This is the case if 
cities genuinely intend to host the Olympic Games.  However, the instrumentalization of the 
bidding process diminishes the value of the event as the focus is on the qualities of the bidding 
city qua city and not on its qualities qua potential Olympic host.  In other words, the main 
concern is not on how to enhance what McAloon calls Olympic heritage, “the inherited cultural 
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capital that distinguishes Olympic from other international sport and is the general source of 
value that makes anyone want to bid for the Olympics in the first place,” but instead to advance a 
city’s, region’s, or country’s appeal.50  Olympic authorities should be wary of such inauthentic 
bids.
Bids put forward to gain relevant experience to mount realistic Olympic bids in the future 
present an interesting situation.  They are obviously utilitarian in nature.  However, these bids 
hope to become serious contenders to host the Olympic Games in the future.  It is rumored that 
cities expressing interest to host the Olympic Games for the first time are sometimes advised by 
Olympic authorities to engage in “introductory” or “practice” bids to prepare themselves better 
for future “full” bids.  If that is the case, it is unreasonable to require these cities to plan a legacy 
in case their bids fail because they do not intend, and have little chances, to win.  Why should
they plan for a foregone conclusion if they know that in the future they will most probably bid 
again?  At best, the legacy here is the bidding itself, as it is meant to improve the chances of 
future bids.  One wonders whether there should be mechanisms in place to assist interested cities 
in preparing robust bids without having to go through “introductory” or “practice” bids.  These 
mechanisms would minimize the instrumentalization of the bidding process and allow to fully 
concentrate on how legitimate bids envision their contributions to Olympic heritage.
A final problem with planning for legacies in case bids to host the Olympic Games fail is 
that bidding is in itself a form of legacy.  McIntosh recognized this almost a decade ago.  For her, 
“it is essential to recognise that the bid process must be thought of in terms of not only being the 
starting point for Games-related legacy development but also as a legacy in itself.”51  This 
recognition is even more important at this juncture of Olympic development in which bidding 
cities are required to articulate a legacy whether their bids are successful or not.  This is so 
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because this requirement does not recognize bidding as a form of legacy.  For McIntosh, bidding
is a form of legacy in that it creates a wealth of knowledge that is accessible and at the disposal 
of future interested cities and bid groups.  “Just as candidates are able to learn from examining 
the Official Report of past Olympic Games organizers,” she argues, “so too can they learn from 
the methodology, ideas, and dreams contained in the documentary evidence left behind by past 
candidate city hopefuls.”52  Based on this idea, McIntosh makes the case that bidding cities’ 
documents should be preserved, not only for their value to future interested cities but also for
their value to better understand the Olympic historical experience.53
This understanding is central to the discussion of legacy in Olympic circles.  For instance, 
MacAloon argues that when it comes to legacy, what bidding officials are really being asked is 
not a list of pay-offs (for example, additions to the urban landscape, jobs created, or an enhanced 
workforce) and catch phrases to promote Olympic values but “how their city will understand, 
rethink, and rework in a serious and deeply informed way the great themes of the Olympic 
historical experience.”54  As intimated above, he prefers the term heritage to legacy, among other 
reasons because it does not refer to just what is left behind but to “that which is widely held to be 
significant in what is left behind.”55  Obviously, what is significant here is related to the inherited 
Olympic cultural capital.56  If when talking about legacy Olympic authorities really have in mind
the kind of project MacAloon says they do (and it is reasonable to believe that this more 
profound understanding of legacy is meant as the IOC is not entirely comfortable with purely 
instrumentalist bids57), it appears to exceed what bid committees can do in case they fail.  It takes
organizing committees years of enormously careful and painstaking labor to first envision and
then deliver their Olympic legacy, and not all of them succeed.  A bid committee does not have 
the capacity, and to reiterate a point made before nor does it have the mandate to reconceptualize 
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and encapsulate in a legacy project the broad Olympic historical experience in case it fails.  The 
risk is to underestimate what legacy entails by coming up with a list of hopefully useful 
endeavors, mostly made of brick and mortar, but with little, if any, symbolically poignant 
Olympic power.  In other words, the risk is that what is left behind is simply “something” but not 
“something Olympically meaningful.”
So, is there anything worth legating when bids fail?  Of course there is, for the efforts of 
failed bid committees is part and parcel of “the sum total of accumulated Olympic cultural, 
historical, political, moral, and symbolic capital.”58  And a very important one. In an important 
sense, bids are at the same time equally complex responses to, celebrations of, and dreams to 
redefine the Olympic historical experience.  As much as successful ones, failed bid committees 
conceive a vision for the Olympic Games, including their planned legacy, as well as a plan to 
execute it.  These visions and plans represent their contribution to the accumulated cultural 
Olympic capital.  They are possible because of the synergy among a number of social, cultural, 
economic, and political forces fostered by a bid, which is also an important part of the legacy of 
bidding.  The whole process by which bid committees, successful or not, conceive their visions 
and plans for the Olympic Games is, as suggested by McIntosh, worth preserving or, simply put, 
leaving behind in a properly organized fashion.  Said in another way, the bid committees’ efforts 
constitute their primary legacy.  If not safeguarded, their importance for the Olympic historical 
experience might be inadequately understood or, perhaps even more damaging, simply forgotten.  
Failed bid committees then would do a great service to the Olympic Movement if their legacy is 
a comprehensive plan to preserve, protect, and make public their entire records and documents.  
A reasonable failed bidding legacy is related to the trajectory of the bid committees more than to 
any list of cost-benefits analyses.  Other forms of legacy are, of course, permissible but should 
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not be mandatory.  Nevertheless, these projects should be economically modest and sustainable 
as well as easy to implement and manage.
At this point, it is fitting to come back to the South American portraiture presented above.  
Has Buenos Aires doubly failed by the inability of its multiple unsuccessful Olympic bids to 
bequeath something prominent to the city?  The answer is partially yes and no.  No because, as 
suggested in this paper, the Buenos Aires’ bids constitute a form of legacy in themselves.  
Throughout the twentieth century, Argentine Olympic officials sought to bring the Olympic 
Games to Buenos Aires to demonstrate their commitment to the Olympic Movement and that 
they were at its forefront in South America.  In the process, they debated and imagined different 
visions for the Olympic Games in their city.  What the Buenos Aires’ failed bids expressed and 
bestowed is a tradition of concern for Olympic matters, which might, among other reasons, 
inspire new bids in the future.  This is a strong legacy.  However, bid officials partially failed in 
that the records and documents of their persistent efforts are, to put it mildly, not well preserved.  
The study of how the Buenos Aires’ failed bids fit in the larger Olympic historical experience is, 
consequently, more arduous than necessary.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, there were some historical 
lacunae in the materials and commentaries surrounding the last Buenos Aires’ failed bid that 
could have been avoided if those records and documents were easily available.59  Finally, it 
would be appropriate if the city’s failed bids occupy a more conspicuous place in the museum of 
the COA and that the Plazoleta Pierre de Coubertin includes references to the failed bids and to 
Argentina’s Olympic tradition.  This would also strengthen the legacy that the Buenos Aires’ 
failed bids constitute in themselves.
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Conclusion
This article contends that the extension of legacy discourse into failed bids, at least as 
typically articulated in Olympic circles, is problematic.  Conceiving and materializing a legacy in 
case bids fail, seems to fall beyond the confines of bid committees’ mandates and
responsibilities.  In addition, there are a number of serious practical challenges to such 
conception and materialization.  While practical difficulties are not definitive, they are 
instructive with regards to the challenges of implementing legacies for failed bids.  Moreover, 
what should be recognized is that bids, successful or not, constitute an important legacy in 
themselves.  Bids provide ample junctures for vibrant debates among different stakeholders 
about how their cities have, are, and ought to develop in the future, which is encapsulated in their 
vision for the Olympic Games.  Thus, it is reasonable to expect that the legacy of failed bids be 
primarily the preservation and protection of the records and documents that made possible 
submitting such a vision to the IOC for its consideration.  Their legacy should be to safeguard the 
legacy that they themselves are.  This would be a significant contribution to the Olympic 
historical experience.  This is the kind of legacy that should be stressed by Olympic authorities 
rather than the customary practical pay-offs, with their emphasis on cost-benefit analyses, so 
dear to the current wave of Olympic legacy advocates and experts.60  Other forms of legacy that 
increase the accumulated Olympic cultural capital in inexpensive and organizationally sensible 
ways are also to be welcome, but they should not be required.
Undoubtedly, the rise of legacy discourse has done much to bring a renewed sense of 
responsibility and accountability to both bid committees and organizing committees of the 
Olympic Games.  The event is too large, too expensive, too important, and too symbolically 
meaningful not to carefully consider what it could and should legate to the cities, regions, and 
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countries hosting it.  However, this does not mean that such discourse should be uncritically 
extended to all areas of Olympic life, including failed bidding.  Academics should question the 
logic of the legacy of failed Olympic bids.  If not, they might uncritically reproduce the 
“unintended but no less pernicious consequences of legacy speech.”61  One potential 
consequence is represented by those who propose to see bidding as a means to an end other than 
obtaining the rights to host the Olympic Games.  Another is a possible “more and bigger is 
better” mentality that would commit bidding cities to increasingly costly legacies in case they 
fail hoping that such promises would situate them more favorably in the bid process.  Neither 
seem necessarily to add much to “increasing the accumulated [Olympic] cultural capital that will 
attract bids and hosts for future Games.”62  There is a case that failed bids can primarily and 
more effectively contribute to the latter by seeing their efforts as a form of legacy worth leaving 
behind in an organized fashion, even if their bids were only concerned with creating the 
traditional sought after pay-offs.  This is what the IOC should mainly expect failed bids to leave 
behind.
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